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     There is a very long tradition from the fourth century B.C. to the nineteenth century, 
in which the logic of Aristotle was studied, commented on, criticized at times, though 
never dethroned, the logic which dominated western thought until the twentieth century. 
It is this we call "Aristotelian Logic". That logic regarded as a science is appropriately 
defined by Kant in these words: "Logic is ... a science a priori of the necessary laws of 
thinking, not, however, in respect of particular objects but all objects in general: it is a 
science, therefore, of the right use of the understanding and of reason as such, not 
subjectively, i.e. not according to empirical (psychological) principles of how the 
understanding thinks, but objectively, i.e. according to a priori principles of how it ought 
to think."1  
     In the development of Aristotelian logic, these necessary laws of thought are derived 
by reference to thought itself as it expresses being and non-being. There are three very 
general principles2 commonly called the Laws (or Principles) of Thought which specify 
what it is to think of something scientifically: the Principle of Identity, which requires 
that the object must be thought as having an immutable nature (A is A); the Principle of 
Contradiction, where it cannot be thought as at once having a certain character and not 
having that character (A cannot be B and not B); and the Principle of Excluded Middle, 
where it either has that character or property or does not have it (A is either B or not B). 
The fuller implications of these three principles will be treated below, where their logic is 
contrasted with the significance of these principles for modern truth-functional logic.  
                                                
1 . Immanuel Kant, Logic (trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz), Indianapolis, 1974, 18. 
 
2 .A fourth principle, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is added by speculative philosophers such as 
Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger. But we shall remain silent about it.  
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     Modern logic was given its classical formulation in Principia Mathematica.3 In that 
work the Principle of Identity (p>p) appears as Th.2.08, the Law of Contradiction -(p.-p) 
as Th. 3.24, the Law of Excluded Middle (pv-p) as Th. 2.11.4 Although these are distinct 
theorems, the three principles of Aristotelian Logic are clearly only interdefinitions in 
Classical logic, for  
(p>p) = (pv-p) = -(p.-p).  
In short, they collapse into one another. As theorems moreover they themselves become 
elements of proofs of subsequent theorems.  
     Aristotle gives these principles distinct interpretations.5 Of the Principle of 
Contradiction he says, "A principle which one must have if he is to understand anything 
is not an hypothesis; and that which one must know if he is to know anything must be in 
his possession for every occasion. Clearly, then, such a principle is the most certain of all; 
and what this principle is we proceed to state. It is: `The same thing cannot at the same 
time both belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect.'" The 
Principle of Excluded Middle is not derived from the Principle of Contradiction; it 
follows rather from the definition of what is truth and falsehood: "What is more, there 
cannot be anything between two contradictories, but of any one subject, one thing must 
either be asserted or denied. This is clear if we first define what is truth and what is 
falsehood. A falsity is a statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not 
that it is; and a truth is a statement of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it 
is not. Hence, he who states of anything that it is, or that it is not, will either speak truly 
or speak falsely. But of what is neither being nor nonbeing it is not said that it is or that it 
is not."6 How do these two principles differ? One way of expressing the difference, 
Aristotle's way, is this: the Principle of Contradiction assures that not everything is true; 
the Principle of Excluded Middle that not everything is false. In his words:  
The statement of Heraclitus, that everything is and is not, seems to make 
everything true, but that of Anaxagoras, that an intermediate exists 
between two contradictories, makes everything false; for when things are 
                                                
3  .Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Cambridge, 1910. In this century the logic of Principia 
Mathematica [henceforth PM] has so succeeded that it is now called "Classical logic", and so it shall be 
called here.  
 
4 .Russell calls these theorems by these names. He states that the Principle of Identity given there is not the 
same as the `law of identity', which is inferred from the Principle later in the work. See Principia 
Mathematica to *56, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 99, 101, 111.  
 
5  But he does not name them Contradiction, Identity, Excluded Middle. That is a later addition. 6. 
Metaphy. IV, 1005b15-20, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle, Bloomington, Ind., 1966, 58.  
 
6  Ibid., 1011b23-29.  
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blended, the blend is neither good nor not-good, so that it is not possible to 
say anything truly.7  
     The Principle of Identity is not derived from either of the others, but from Aristotle's 
reflections on the unity and being of substance: "To ask why something is itself is to 
inquire into nothing, for the fact or the existence of something must be clear. Thus, the 
fact that something is itself, this is the one answer, and the one cause in all cases, as, for 
example, in the questions `Why is a man a man?' and `Why is the musical musical?', 
unless one were to answer that each thing is indivisible from itself, since to be one for 
each thing is to be indivisible from itself. But this [that a thing is itself] is common to all 
things and a short answer for all of them."8 The Principle of Identity is not as it might 
appear the abstract reiteration of a term as subject and predicate. In its propositional form, 
as Hegel observes, there is promise of a distinction between subject and predicate, as well 
as identity.9 A true appreciation of this principle is found in Leibniz, who holds that all 
truth is identity, but not an empty repetition stripped of difference. The Principle of 
Identity is rather the assertion of the unity of what is different.  
   These three principles in the long tradition of Aristotelian logic are distinct from one 
another, serving as regulative principles of the understanding rather than as rules of 
inference or elements of proofs. In these two respects they stand opposed to their 
interpretation in Classical logic. There is another fundamental difference between the two 
interpretations: Aristotelian logic holds these principles as self-evident.10 Classical logic 
regards them as tautological elements of a formal system which itself is at most a theory 
of ratiocination. This requires elaboration for the sake of the subsequent argument.  
    The formal system of PM regarded as a `theory' of logic11 is not to be judged true or 
false, but more or less adequate to that which it is devised to order and systematize. The 
elements of the formal system are given `interpretations' which, ideally, make the axioms 
turn out true in domains of discourse to which the formal system is applied. But as with 
theorems in general, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, in the deductions made 
from the theory and their agreement with experience, in the case of PM in the theorems 
                                                
7  Ibid., 1012a25-29.  
 
8  Ibid. VII, 1041a15-20 
9  Encyclopedia Logic, n.115.  
10  Aristotle states emphatically, for example, that though the Principle of Contradiction is the most certain 
of all, it cannot be demonstrated. But the position of one who says that it is possible for the same thing to 
be and not to be [to deny then the Principle of Contradiction] can be refuted "if only our opponent says 
something." Aristotle produces, in Metaphy. IV, ch.4 (1006a29 - 1009a5) at least seven "demonstrations by 
refutation", as he calls them, to show that he who denies the Principle of Contradiction must assume it to 
effect his denial.  
 
11 This position was early expressed by Ernst Nagel in "Logic without Ontology", in Naturalism and the 
Human Spirit, ed. J.H.Krikorian, New York, 1944.  
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deducible from the axioms and their applicability to logical interests. The three principles 
in question as formulated in the Formal System PM are simply valid-within-the-system. 
We shall see that the Principle of Excluded Middle as formulated in Th. 2.11 of PM, (pv-
p), presents difficulties when interpreted as a logical principle with absolute validity.  
 
A. Difficulties With The Principle Of Excluded Middle Of Classical Logic, (Pv-P) 
    There are deviations from Classical logic for various reasons, some relatively 
innocuous, others so fundamental they amount, in Quine's expression, to "changing the 
subject."12 Among the innocuous `deviant logics' are many-valued logics, where 
propositions are not simply divided into `true' and `false', but, say, `true', `false' and 
`possible'. Such logics obviously deny the Principle of Excluded Middle, (pv-p), of 
Classical logic, but still use the two-valued logic as their paradigm. In Intuitionist logic 
there occurs a fundamental deviation.  
     Let us recall the history of the birth of Classical logic, and the reasons for the 
Intuitionist deviation from it. With the production of non-Euclidean geometries in the 
nineteenth century, there was a perceived crisis in the foundations of mathematics. The 
consistency of rival geometries showed that axioms and postulates were not self-evident 
truths, but were themselves to be judged within axiom systems for consistency, 
completeness, independence, but not for truth. Mathematics then required a more 
rigorous foundation than simple conformity to our intuitions of counting and measuring. 
Moreover, there was great interest in the counter-intuitional results of Cantor concerning 
the comparison and ordering of infinite collections,13 the hierarchy from those that are 
countable (as the natural numbers) to those that are uncountable (the real numbers). In his 
development of abstract set theory, Cantor produced the ascending series of transfinite 
cardinals, results which were as exciting as they were mind-bending. But just as his work 
was winning general acceptance, contradictions and paradoxes began to appear: the 
Burali-Forti paradox in 1897, Russell's paradox (concerning the set of all sets that are not 
members of themselves), and Cantor's own paradox in 1899. There was pressing need, 
therefore, to secure mathematics on a firm foundation.  
    Mathematicians of the latter part of the century set about to secure these foundations in 
two ways: (1) to derive mathematics from a logical system itself more fundamental than 
mathematics [Frege in his Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze, Russell in PM, the `logicists' 
                                                
12  W.O.Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge MA, 1970, 81: "Here, evidently, is the deviant logician's 
predicament: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject."  
 
13  Galileo and others anticipated the idea, first formulated by Dedekind in 1888, that an infinite set is one 
that can be put in 1-1 correspondence with a proper subset of itself. Cf. W. and M. Kneale, The 
Development of Logic, Oxford, 1966, 440. Stephen Kleene, Mathematical Logic, NewYork, 1967, 176-7, 
adds: "In 1638, Galileo noted the `paradox' that the squares of the positive integers can be place in 1-1 
correspondence with all the positive integers, contrary to the axiom of Euclid that the whole is greater than 
any of its parts."  
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in short]; (2) to formulate mathematics as a formal axiomatic system, and prove the 
system consistent, that is, free from contradiction by finitist methods14 [Hilbert and his 
followers, the `formalists' in short]. Both programs failed, the logicist program because of 
the discovery of the `antinomies' resulting from self-referentiality15, the formalist program 
because of Godel's incompleteness proofs.16  
   `Intuitionism' rose out of the ashes of the destructive effect of the `antinomies', and 
found new impetus in the results of Godel. Brouwer, its early twentieth century leader, 
maintained that the need for a Fregean logical foundation or rigorous axiomatization only 
appeared because mathematics had extended itself beyond its limits. In a paper "The 
untrustworthiness of the principles of logic" (1908), he criticized the unexamined use of 
the laws of Classical logic, in particular the Law of Excluded Middle, (p v -p). According 
it absolute validity in cases extending to all natural numbers, for example, leads to results 
unacceptable to Intuitionists. For consider, say, the proposition p: "There is an 
uninterrupted run of 1000 nines in the decimal expansion of B." Such a proposition is 
virtually undecidable, for though one might very improbably find such a run and hence 
affirm the proposition as true, there is no way to prove the proposition false, the infinite 
sequence of digits not being exhaustible. The intuitionist rejects the application of (pv-p) 
where infinite sequences or an infinite set is in question. Thus, for him the principle does 
not have universal validity.  
    Of course the intuitionist rejection of the principle (pv-p) cannot be done without 
discarding other elements of the logic of PM, (p>p), -(p.-p) [given their equivalence to 
(pv-p)], and also one half of the law of double negation, (p=--p).17 Rejecting (pv-p), 
                                                
14 That is, procedures that do not involve the conception of the completed infinite.  
 
15  There are, of courses, the various devices (such as Russell's `theory of logical types') for avoiding the 
production of the known antinomies without forsaking general set theory . But these are stop-gap measures. 
As Quine [The Ways of Paradox, Cambridge, Mass., 1976, 16] aptly observes: "We cannot simply withhold 
each antinomy-producing membership condition and assume classes corresponding to the rest. The trouble 
is that there are membership conditions corresponding to each of which, by itself, we can innocuously 
assume a class, and yet these classes together can yield a contradiction. ... I remarked earlier that the 
discovery of antinomy is a crisis in the evolution of thought. In general set theory the crisis began sixty 
years ago [written in 1961] and is not yet over." Nor is it over today.  
 
16  What Godel proved in 1931 was that no deductive system, whatever its axioms, is able theoretically to 
prove all the truths of elementary number theory. He did this by constructing a sentence in elementary 
number theory which is true if and only if it is not a theorem of number theory, the complete analogue, in 
layman's terms, of "I am unprovable." As Stephen Kleene explains, "Godel's sentence `I am unprovable' is 
not paradoxical. We escape paradox because (whatever Hilbert may have hoped) there is no a priori reason 
why every true sentence must be provable." [ "The Work of Kurt Godel", The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 
41 (1976), in S.G. Shanker ed, Godel's Theorem in Focus, London, 1988, 54.] Godel showed that any 
number-theoretic formal system, consisting of a logic to which is added number-theoretic axioms, is 
incomplete if it is consistent. The logical part, the formal system PM, has been proven complete. Thus, the 
number-theoretic axioms must ever be incomplete, and with this result Hilbert's program is demolished.  
 
17  Intuitionists must reject --p>p (hence p=--p), for if p=--p, then --p>p immediately reduces to p>p (i.e. to 
pv-p).  
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intuitionist logic must also reject reductio ad absurdum, which relies in one of its steps 
on (pv-p).18 The logic that remains lacks the simplicity, convenience and familiarity of 
the logic of PM, and the arsenal of tools familiar to the mathematician (reductio ad 
absurdum and mathematical induction among them) is considerably reduced. The system 
that is produced can be construed as a fragment of the logic of PM, having PM as its only 
complete enlargement.19 Obscured perhaps in the logic which is left is the intuitionist's 
demand for constructive proofs for mathematical objects -- he is intolerant of arguments 
which purport to produce mathematical objects simply by showing the falsity of the 
assumption of the non-existence of such objects. For most mathematicians the price the 
intuitionist would exact is too high, even as they grant the cogency of his reasons , and 
themselves recognize a constructive proof as sounder than that which has been 
demonstrated non-constructively.  
    Although Brouwer's `intuitionism' antedates Godel's incompleteness theorems, the 
position was strengthened by Godel's results which demonstrated that there are formally 
undecidable propositions of PM and related systems. In Godel's own words, "...it can be 
proven rigorously that in every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of 
finitary number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic propositions and that, 
moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be proved in the system."20 Quine, 
notwithstanding his complete loyalty to Classical logic, is moved to say, "The excess of 
admitted questions over possible answers seems especially regrettable when the questions 
are mathematical and the answers mathematically impossible."21  
    If there is dispute about the propriety or justification of a logical principle such as pv-p, 
how might one settle the dispute? Intuitionists reject the principle in question, whereas 
present-day mathematicians, who tend to describe themselves as Platonists or realists,22 
accept the principle, though sometimes with reservations:  
There are also differences of viewpoint concerning the lengths to which 
one may be prepared to carry one's Platonism - if, indeed one claims to be 
a Platonist. ...When all the ramifications of set theory are considered, one 
comes across sets which are so wildly enormous and nebulously 
constructed that even a fairly determined Platonist such as myself may 
                                                
18  A reductio ad absurdum proof of, say, t runs this way: assume -t. Derive a contradi ction q.-q. Then -t > 
(q.-q), which is absurd. Thus, because tv-t, then t.  
 
19  As A. Tarski proved. Cf. Kneale and Kneale, 574. But to construe it as a `fragment of PM' is to 
misconstrue it, for intuitionist logic intends its results to be radically different from PM.  
 
20 Kurt Godel, "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I" 
(1931) in .Shanker, 40-1. 
 
21  Philosophy of Logic, 87.  
 
22 `Realists' because they hold that mathematical conjectures are true or false prior to and independent of 
the proofs whereby they are established; thus they cannot go so far as intuitionists in rejecting some form of 
`either p or not p'.  
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begin to have doubts about their existence ... There may come a stage at 
which the sets have such convoluted and conceptually dubious definitions 
that the question of the truth or falsity of mathematical statements 
concerning them may begin to take on a somewhat `matter-of-opinion' 
quality rather than a `God-given' one.23  
Mathematicians of various stripes have difficulties, it would seem, with the principle pv-
p. If they will not go so far as the intuitionists in a radical solution to these difficulties, 
they must nonetheless find them annoying and, as Quine might put it, `regrettable'.  
 
B. The Principle Of Excluded Middle In Aristotelian Logic 
   There is confusion about Aristotle's understanding of the Principle of Excluded Middle 
originating, we shall argue, in an inadequacy of Classical logic -- it is a blunt instrument -
- to express the Aristotelian position. The chief criticism of the Aristotelian account and 
confusion about it centre on Aristotle's reservations about the principle applied to future 
contingents in De Interpretatione, ch.9. An analysis of the argument there and in ch. 7 of 
that work will show Aristotle's account is clear and unambiguous, and at the same time 
reveal what is inadequate if the argument is approached under the paradigm of Classical 
logic.  
    Aristotle begins De.Interp., ch. 9, with a statement of what is called the Principle of 
Bivalence,24 although here limited to what is or what has taken place: "With regard to 
things present or past propositions whether positive or negative are true of necessity or 
false." [18a28-9] As shown in Aristotle's account of `opposition', affirmative/negative 
universal propositions are opposed as contradictories to negative/affirmative particular 
propositions, and there one contradictory must be true and the other false.25 But two 
universal propositions, one affirmative and the other negative are opposed as contraries; 
it is impossible that both propositions are true, though both might be false.26 Aristotle is at 
pains here to distinguish two sorts of negations: any universal proposition can be the 
                                                
23 Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford, 1989, 113.  
 
24  Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic, Oxford, 1951, 82: "...the so-called principle of bivalence which 
state that every proposition is either true or false, i.e. that it has one and only one of two possible truth 
values: truth and falsity." He continues: "This principle must not be mixed up with the law of excluded 
middle, according to which of two contradictory propositions one must be true."  
 
25 As "Every man is white" and "Not every man is white" ["Some man is not white."]  
 
26 As "Every man is white" and "No man is white", ch.7, 17b16-22. Subcontrariety is not an `opposition' in 
Aristotle's sense: "The particular affirmative and particular negative do not have opposition properly 
speaking, because opposition is concerned with the same subject." St. Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan, 
Comm. On Interpretation, trans. Jean T. Oesterle, Milwaukee, 1962, 90. The subjects of particular 
propositions having the same subject term are indeterminate for any singular thing, thus may or may not 
intersect.  
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negation of another as its contrary (All S is P; All S is nonP), and here they can be false 
at the same time; or as its contradictory(All S is P; Some S is nonP), and here one must 
be true and the other false. Therefore, "Of two opposites it is not the case always that one 
must be true and the other false." In Classical logic there is only the one form of 
opposition, propositional negation. This marks a fundamental difference between the two 
logics. The Classical logician, blind to contrariety, interprets what he reads in Aristotle 
solely ( and therefore inadequately) as propositional negation. 27 
    "Socrates is not white", an example of a singular proposition, is the proper negation of 
"Socrates is white", and here too, as with contradictory propositions, one must be true 
and the other false because such propositions regarding things present (or past) are 
determinate. But not so with opposed singular propositions about future contingent 
matters. It is this case which is the subject matter of Ch. 9, and the question is whether in 
singular propositions about future contingencies, propositions such as "There will be a 
sea battle tomorrow", "There won't be a sea battle tomorrow", it is necessary that one of 
the opposites be true and the other false.  
    The problem is set in a metaphysical context of contingency and necessity. Does the 
analysis of truth and falsity in propositions and being and non-being in things actual and 
past imply a fatalistic necessity of being and non-being in future things? If what has been 
said should suggest that per impossible all events come about of necessity, then we must 
subject the Principle of Excluded Middle to further scrutiny. The Philosopher's gaze will 
be directed toward singular propositions concerning that which may or may not come to 
pass in the future. But why singular propositions, such as `Socrates will be executed 
tomorrow', and not universal propositions, `All living things will die' for example? 
Singular propositions pertaining to what will or will not be can, some of them at least, be 
said to be contingent, whereas universal propositions as universal have their predicates 
necessarily in their subjects, are "big with the future" as one might say, as death is there 
given in the being of the living thing.28 Why again only propositions about the future? 
What is different about that which is past or present? There is nothing of contingency in 
what has been, nor in what is actual. The actual as actual is beyond the contingency of 
what may or may not be - it is realized possibility.  
    Aristotle states the dimensions of the problem in this way:  
For if every affirmation or negation is true or false [Principle of Excluded 
Middle] it is necessary for everything either to be the case or not to be the 
case. For if one person says that something will be and another denies this 
                                                
27 See Fred Sommers, The Logic of Natural Language. Oxford, 1982, viii, Chaps.13 and 14, and Appendix 
B. Sommers' book was largely inspired by the difference between these two forms of opposition and the 
one form in Classical logic.  
 
28 Aquinas says, "...those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to singulars, whereas those 
that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to singulars according to the notions of their universals." 
Comm. on Interp., 104. Thus `Socrates will die' is determinately true, having nothing of contingency in it 
even though of the future.  
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same thing, it is clearly necessary for one of them to be saying what is true 
-- if every affirmative is true or false [Principle of Bivalence]; for both 
will not be the case together under such circumstances. ... it follows that 
nothing is or is happening, or will be or will not be, by chance or as 
chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since 
either he who says or he who denies is saying what is true.)29  
The argument of Chap. 9 shows that what follows from the assumption that one of 
opposites must be true and the other false is untenable because impossible. Then (at 
19a23) Aristotle proceeds most directly to express the distinctions required to state the 
truth of the matter.  
    There are different grades of contingency that are threatened if opposed propositions 
about future singular things must be one true and one false, and a different analysis is 
appropriate to each of them. As long as something will be in the future, it will be there in 
one way or another in its cause, determinately in some cases and therefore necessarily 
(`Socrates will die'), as an inclination in other cases but such that the cause could be 
impeded (`Socrates will be executed tomorrow'), lastly as a potency purely (`The cat will 
catch the mouse.') 30 For our purposes the second and third cases yield different and 
perhaps unexpected results.  
    When two opposed propositions speak of future contingencies, as in Aristotle's 
example "There will be a sea-battle tomorrow", "There won't be a sea-battle tomorrow", 
even if there is a strong inclination toward the former -- the ships on both sides 
assembled, the conflict between the warring parties extreme, the weather propitious, 
Aristotle insists that we must reject the conclusion that either he who says there will be 
such a battle speaks truly or he who says there won't be speaks truly. There is nothing 
determinate to make one or other of those pronouncements true.31 But if neither 
proposition is true, then this proposition is also not true (given that it says one of the 
disjuncts is true):  
(1) `Either the sea-battle will take place tomorrow or the sea-battle 
won't..32 
Because it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, 
what is true is necessarily true when it is true, but not before it is true.33 But, adds 
                                                
29 18a34- b8, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. J.LAckrill, Oxford, 1963, 50.  
 
30 Aquinas, Comm.on Interp.. 107.  
 
31 Cf. 18a35 - b8 for the reductio ad impossibile of the position.  
 
32  A proper symbolization of this proposition would not be the disjunction (pv-p) of Classical logic, but `a 
is P or a is not-P'. See Sommers, 308-9.  
 
33 "What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not." 19a23, Ackrill, 52.  
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Aristotle, "it is not possible to say neither is true; that is, to say that a thing neither 
will take place nor will not take place." (18b17) Thus, this proposition is not 
acceptable:  
(2) `The sea-battle neither will take place nor will not take place.'  
That proposition also illicitly says something determinate -- it asserts that both disjuncts 
are false.  
      Is there a proper assertion falling under the Principle of Excluded Middle in this case? 
Clearly (pv-p) won't do, for it asserts the truth of one of the disjuncts and would thus fall 
under the same objections as (1). One could say, with Aristotle:  
Clearly then it is not necessary that of every affirmative and opposite 
negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things 
that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be; 
with these it is as we have said. (19a39) 34 
and that is as explicit a denial of the Principle of Excluded Middle, at least as given in 
Classical logic, as one could find. Furthermore, it should be clear that Aristotle is here 
denying the truth or falsity of  
(3) The sea-battle will take place tomorrow.  
(4) The sea-battle won't take place tomorrow.  
Thus, in the argument of Chap. 9, it must be said that propositions are not always true or 
false, a denial of the universal applicability of the Principle of Bivalence.  
    It is therefore not a little strange to read Kneale's analysis of Chap. 9: he says that what 
Aristotle is apparently doing is questioning the Principle of Bivalence while accepting the 
Principle of Excluded Middle. Interpolating Aristotle's words, Kneale concludes:  
For while he asserts that `everything must either be or not be, or about to 
be or not be [19a27-30], he also says `It is not necessary that of every 
affirmation and denial of opposed statements one should be true and the 
other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially but not actually 
the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold 
good.'[19a39-b4]. This appears to mean that the disjunction of a statement 
                                                
34 There are other assertions of some apparent form of Excluded Middle, at 19a30 for example: "I mean, for 
example, it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for the sea 
battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place..." Ackrill, 53. Sommers, 308-9, suggests what 
he calls a categorial principle, `A sea-battle will-or-won't take place tomorrow." This has the merit of 
expressing the potentiality of the situation today appropriately, and at the same time one is not led to the 
conclusion rejected most forcefully by Aristotle that one or other disjunct is actually true.  
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and its negation can be true without either the original statement of its 
negation being true. In other words, Aristotle is trying to assert the Law of 
Excluded Middle while denying the Principle of Bivalence. We have 
already seen this is a mistake..35  
    The Principle of Excluded Middle that Kneale thinks Aristotle is asserting is the 
notorious (pv-p) of Classical logic. But Aristotle is questioning both Bivalence and 
Excluded Middle as the argument above has shown, though neither in the form (pv-p), to 
which Kneale reduces both in his argument. In trying to understand these passages 
Kneale is an unwitting slave to an inappropriate principle . His "solution" (that Aristotle 
should recognize that the sentence `There will be a sea-battle tomorrow' expresses the 
same proposition as the sentence `There is a sea-battle' uttered tomorrow) shows that he 
interprets each from the simplistic principle (pv-p) of Classical logic, a principle 
completely inadequate to the discussion, and missing Aristotle's difficulties entirely. 
Kneale's so-called "solution" is Aristotle's problem: if today a proposition about 
tomorrow's contingency is true, how can this be without falling into the untoward 
consequences Aristotle has put before us. Storrs McCall offers a `proof' similar to 
Kneale's which begins: "What Aristotle seems not to have noticed is that the two 
doctrines, that `p' is true if and only if p, and that some propositions are neither true nor 
false are incompatible."36 But Tarski's criterion of truth, " p is true if and only if p", 
differs radically from Aristotle's "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, 
is false; while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true." 
[Metaphy.1110b26-28] Tarski's criterion is sentential (p is a sentence), `Platonist' in 
intention (sentences are true and false apart from any "saying" of them), and properly 
applied as Tarski himself shows in formal, not natural language. Aristotle's definition is 
appropriate to the categorical proposition (Saying of all or some S that is P that it is P), 
with safeguards against the radical Platonist/realist implications of Tarski's definition, 
and properly applied in natural language.  
    Peter Geach gives a completely bogus reading of Aristotle's statement "It is not 
possible to say neither is true; that is to say, that a thing neither will take place nor will 
not take place," (the passage analyzed above). In a series of steps acceptable only to 
Classical logic, he reduces `Not: neither F nor not-F' to `Not:not:either F or not-F', then 
by Double Negation to `Either F or not-F' -- the Classical Law of Excluded Middle. He 
writes:  
People have tried to maintain (sometimes appealing to three-valued logic) 
that of a pair of contradictory predictions relating to a future continency 
neither need be true. (Sometimes they say that neither need be 
determinately true; but this qualification, though it may make their 
doctrine easier to swallow, is quite devoid of sense.) Oddly enough, they 
claim as precedent the famous chapter ix of Aristotle's De Interpretatione. 
                                                
35 Kneale and Kneale, 48, underlining mine.  
 
36 McCall in "A Non-Classical Theory of Truth", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1979), 83-86.  
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In fact, Aristotle expressly rejects the idea of such a breakdown of our 
Law (op.cit. 18b,18-20). Moreover, he supplies a strong argument against 
the idea. What is now true to say that a thing will be, it will be true to say 
that it is or has been; so, if it is now true to say of Jones that he is neither 
going to be hanged tomorrow nor not, then tomorrow it will be true to say 
of him that he neither has been hanged nor has not; and this sort of result, 
Aristotle says, is absurd (op.cit. 18b,22-25)37  
As the argument above shows, Aristotle in that passage stands against asserting any 
indeterminate proposition as true. Far from "expressly rejecting the breakdown of our 
Law", he is not accepting a Principle of Excluded Middle in any of its guises when it 
purports to determine the indeterminate. One could hardly have read Aristotle in a more 
bizarre manner.38  
    To complete our analysis of Chap.9, there is still the case to be considered where a 
future contingent is in its cause as a bare potency. Aristotle gives this example: "Thus, 
this coat may be cut in two halves; yet it may not be cut in two halves. It may wear out 
before it is cut." If it should happen that the coat is destroyed this day by fire, then the 
two propositions `This coat will be cut in half' and `This coat will not be cut in half' are 
both false, there being no coat. As Aristotle explains in Categories x  
The statement that `Socrates is ill' is the contrary of `Socrates is well'. Yet 
we cannot maintain even here that one statement must always be true and 
the other must always be false. For, if Socrates really exists, one is true 
and the other false. But if Socrates does not exist, both the one and the 
other are false.39  
    Where the subject of a proposition is vacuous, then it and its negation are related as 
contraries, there being only the opposition of the predicate, not contradictories, and both 
propositions are false. This would obtain for all propositions with vacuous `definite 
descriptions', for example the hackneyed `The present king of France is bald.' Sommers 
would extend this analysis also to propositions where predication is a category mistake.  
 
    The reservations Aristotle has and distinctions he makes about his own Principle of 
Excluded Middle (and Bivalence) are grounded in his metaphysics. We have grown 
accustomed to another logic and narrower metaphysics; and so we must stretch our 
understanding to be equal to these profound arguments. For Aristotle logical propositions 
are related to truth and falsity as things to being and non-being. When things are 
                                                
37 "The Law of Excluded Middle" in Peter Geach, Logic Matters, Berkeley, 1972, 81.  
 
38 Sommers, 310, says, "Not one of the distinctions needed for an understanding of chapter 9 is available to 
the interpreter who comes to it with a Fregean organon."  
 
39 13b15-18, trans. Harold P. Cook, London (Loeb), 1962, 95.  
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indeterminate either because they are not actual or not completely given in their causes, 
propositions about them must be similarly indefinite. This is ever the case in things that 
neither always are (necessary being) nor always are not (impossibilities), but sometimes 
are and sometimes are not. There are, no doubt, eternal truths in the temporal world, but 
not all truths are eternal. And so it is not necessary that of every affirmation and its 
negation, one must be true and the other false.  
 
C. Concluding Reflections On Interpreting Philosophy 
    Classical logic has been described as a "blunt instrument" in dissecting Aristotle's 
argument: the subtleties required are just not available to it. There is something likewise 
less than satisfactory about the application of Classical logic to mathematics, a certain 
uniformity and bluntness there too which the Intuitionist rejects. There are other cases not 
mentioned in this paper, where the generic character of Classical logic, its homogenous 
`one-size-fits-all' approach becomes intolerable. Heisenberg's `uncertainty principle', 
fundamental to the structure of quantum mechanics, cannot be accommodated to 
Classical logic; nor, it should be added, could Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, to 
mention only some from the history of modern philosophy.  
    Classical logic, with its Principles of Double Negation and Excluded Middle, is not 
without its metaphysics, changing, developing, evolving, from its earliest statements in 
Frege and Russell, expressed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, through the analytical 
philosophies that give priority to language, to more recent analysts who give priority to 
the structure of thought expressed in language. What do these philosophies which take 
Classical logic for granted have in common, and what, if anything, do those other 
philosophical positions share in their common opposition to the prevailing logic? Except 
for obvious differences which grow out of matters we have addressed, these questions are 
beyond the scope of this paper.40  
    It is clear that those who subscribe to the Classical position on Bivalence and Excluded 
Middle, do express some form of `realism' [Dummett's characterization]: there is for them 
a "world" which is what it is whether we know it or not; and true propositions are simply 
those that express what is the case with the world. The world might be completely 
unknown, many of its "truths" unknowable in principle, as the mathematical `realists' (or 
`Platonists' as they prefer to call themselves) would grant; nonetheless "truths" about the 
"world" would subsist, "absolute, external and eternal."41 How have we come to this again 
as a viable philosophical position, after the whole history of modern philosophy which 
                                                
40 These questions are addressed in Michael Dummett's book, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, 
Cambridge MA, 1990. He calls the two groups `realists' and `anti-realists'. `Realists', he says, share a 
common doctrine, which cannot be said of the `anti-realists'. What unites them in their opposition to the 
`realists' is simply their rejection of the Principle of Bivalence.  
 
41 In the words of Penrose about mathematics, op.cit., 113. 
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stands opposed to it? From the Cartesian cogito, to the subjective idealism of Berkeley 
and Hume, to the `Copernican Revolution' of Kant, we have long known the `egocentric 
predicament' of attempting to assert the purported existence of a world apart from a 
known world.  
    To trace the history of this (largely) twentieth century `realism' would be long, and out 
of place here. Whatever its origin, in Frege's rejection of what he calls "psychologism" or 
elsewhere, this much can be said, that the logic which he invented was so radical and so 
remarkably compelling and productive that it effected its own revolution. Frege 
succeeded in reducing all of classical mathematics to a single formal system. But that 
would have had only esoteric interest. His revolution in logic lies in his doctrine that 
singular sentences are atoms, and more complex propositions are simply truth-functions 
of these atoms. Once a mechanical calculus of truth-functions was provided, then 
Classical logic became an extraordinarily powerful technique for manipulating these 
atoms, ordering them in ways that serve the prevailing interest in the logic of 
contingencies, the concatenation of `facts' for practical and theoretical purposes. After 
Russell made it popular, Classical logic applied its calculus to ever widening fields, to 
switching circuits (in 1930), to scientific discourse (from the late 20's), to the computer 
(the Turing machine, its theoretical model, in 1937), to every form of academic interest 
claiming to be science, and to every sort of technological interest. In its wonderful 
simplicity, power and decidability it is said to have advanced in a very short time beyond 
everything achieved in logic in its previous 2000 year history. In this case, it is the logic 
which carries the metaphysics with it: the `realism' of our times is consequent on the 
unquestioned success and authority of Classical logic.  
    If anything else is to be gleaned from the matters analyzed here, perhaps it is this, that 
Classical logic is a particularly inept instrument to analyze those philosophies which 
stand opposed to the `realism' it demands. Yet we see such analyses everywhere in 
philosophical literature, presented as though they were objective assessments of positions 
they can at best dogmatically oppose.  
*** 
